Incentive contracts and the compensation of health care providers by Allard, Marie et al.
 Économie publique/Public economics 
09 | 2001/3
Modélisation économique et réforme des systèmes de
santé
Incentive contracts and the compensation of
health care providers
Marie Allard, Helmuth Cremer et Maurice Marchand
Édition électronique
URL : http://journals.openedition.org/economiepublique/564
ISSN : 1778-7440
Éditeur
IDEP - Institut d'économie publique
Édition imprimée
Date de publication : 15 juillet 2002
ISBN : 2-8041-3635-3
ISSN : 1373-8496
 
Référence électronique
Marie Allard, Helmuth Cremer et Maurice Marchand, « Incentive contracts and the compensation of
health care providers », Économie publique/Public economics [En ligne], 09 | 2001/3, mis en ligne le 07
décembre 2005, consulté le 20 avril 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/
economiepublique/564 
© Tous droits réservés
public economics
économiepublique
Revue de l’Institut d’Économie Publique
Deux numéros par an
no 9 – 2001/3

économiepublique sur internet : www.economie-publique.fr
© Institut d’économie publique – IDEP
Centre de la Vieille-Charité
2, rue de la Charité – F-13002 Marseille
Tous droits réservés pour tous pays.
Il est interdit, sauf accord préalable et écrit de l’éditeur, de reproduire (notamment
par photocopie) partiellement ou totalement le présent ouvrage, de le stocker dans
une banque de données ou de le communiquer au public, sous quelque forme et
de quelque manière que ce soit.
La revue économiepublique bénéficie du soutien du Conseil régional Provence-Alpes-
Côte d’Azur
ISSN 1373-8496
IDEP
INSTITUT D'ECONOMIE PUBLIQUE
Incentive
contracts and the compensation
of health care providers
Marie Allard
HEC, Montreal
Helmuth Cremer
University of Toulouse (GREMAQ and IDEI)
Maurice Marchand
CORE-IAG, UC Louvain
1 Introduction
Rapid growth of expenditures on health care has made the incentive
effects on provider behavior of reimbursement systems a central issue
in the literature that deals with the design of compensation schemes.
Starting from Ellis and McGuire (1986) it has mostly focused on the
implications of fixed and cost-based payment systems on cost reduc-
tion effort and quality of care.1 It has generally reached the conclusion
that systems that mix prospective and retrospective reimbursements
are the most effective in trading off optimally these two criteria. More
recently, as stressed by Newhouse (1996), their effect on the selection
of patients by health care providers has become a major concern. This
concern has been raised e.g. in the UK following the allocation of bud-
gets to general practitioners for purchasing selected hospital services
on behalf of their patients.2 In parallel, empirical studies have shown
that the way physicians are compensated has generally some signifi-
cant effect on the utilization of medical services.3 In particular, the way
in which the general practitioner’s marginal per-patient compensation
1 See, for instance, Ellis and McGuire (1990), Ma (1994), Ma and McGuire (1997) and Chalkley
and Malcomson (1998).
2 See, for instance, Matsaganis and Glennerster (1994).
3 See, for instance, McGuire and Pauly (1991), Krasnik et al (1990) and Gruber and Owings
(1996).
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varies with their workload has proved to significantly affect their beha-
vior with respect to the number of patients they find optimal to treat.4
This literature has generally adopted the assumption that phy-
sicians are homogeneous in all respects, ignoring that they differ in
terms of productivity or preference for leisure. This assumption is not
realistic : heterogeneity of physicians can indeed explain the large dis-
crepancies in workload that are observed across physicians. By trea-
ting physicians as identical the existing literature has kept aside an
important feature of the market for physician services.
Our purpose in this paper is to contribute to remedying this short-
coming by developing a model of physician remuneration in which doc-
tors differ in productivity. We assume that the public agency in charge
of setting the remunerations of physicians cannot observe their indivi-
dual productivities. This generates a principal-agent problem in which
the asymmetry between the regulator and the physicians is related to
the productivity of the latter. In the model we build in this paper doctors
are assumed to compete for patients through the quality of care they
provide. They choose the number of patients they treat by maximizing
a utility function that trades off the income they earn, the time they
keep for leisure, and the quality of care they supply to their patients.
In order to focus on the heterogeneity of physicians, patients are assu-
med to be identical in all respects, including their medical needs. No
co-payment is charged to patients.
The public agency that regulates the health care system is con-
cerned with both the quality of care and the level of expenditures. When
deciding upon how to relate a doctor’s overall compensation to his num-
ber of patients, the agency tries to make him choose the number of
patients that is optimal given his productivity while insuring that he
participates in the scheme. Through the level of compensation it also
tries to achieve the patient-to-doctor ratio that trades off optimally the
quality of care and total expenditures : the more generous the per pa-
tient compensation paid to doctors the lower the ratio.
The model developed in the next three sections abstracts from the
possibility of making doctors pay for the cost of the tests and treatments
they prescribe on behalf of their patients. In Section 5 we extend the
model to account for this possibility by including those services as an
explicit input in the doctor’s production function. The quality of service
provided to patients then depends upon both the doctor’s effort and
the amount of medical services prescribed. As in the U.K. for general
practitioners we make doctors hold budgets for covering either in part
or in full the cost of tests and treatments they prescribe to patients.
4 Using the Quebec experience, Rochaix (1993) studies the extent to which joint price-quality
regulation affects physicians’ activity rates. In particular, she was interested by their be-
havioral responses to the implementation of financial controls (fee freeze) and prospective
payment systems (ceiling).
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Our purpose is to investigate how this cost sharing should interact with
the compensation paid to doctors.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section the features
of our basic model are presented in detail. In particular, we explain how
doctors compete for patients. Section 3 studies the full information op-
timum which is achieved when the regulator can observe the individual
productivity of doctors. This optimum is used as a benchmark when we
study in Section 4 the regulator’s optimum with asymmetry of infor-
mation. In Section 5, we make the quality of care depend upon both the
doctor’s effort and the medical services provided to patients. This en-
ables us to study how the cost of services prescribed to patients should
be shared between doctors and the public agency.
2 The market for medical services
2.1 Physicians and patients
In the market for medical services, the demand side consists of P pa-
tients who have identical medical needs. On the supply side, physi-
cians (or health care providers) differ in their productivity, that is the
efficiency with which they transform medical inputs into improvement
of their patients’ health state. This is summarized in a production func-
tion, h(pie), which specifies a patient’s health improvement as a function
of the time (or effort), e, devoted by the physician to each of his patients
and of the physician’s productivity, pi. Later we shall introduce an ad-
ditional input as argument of the health production function, namely
the amount of medical services prescribed by the physician on behalf
of his patients. We assume that h(pie) is increasing and concave in pie
with h(0) = 0. Neither e nor pi are observable by the regulator finan-
cing health care expenditures; 5 moreover health improvement h(pie) is
not verifiable.6 Each patient must be registered with a physician. The
number of patients registered with a physician is denoted by n; this
variable is observable (and verifiable) by the regulator.
A physician’s utility is given by
u(n, T, e) = T + γnh(pie)− v(ne), (1)
where T is the provider’s compensation (or transfer) paid by the regu-
lator, γ is a parameter measuring his concern for the patient’s health
(improvement), while v(ne) represents disutility of effort. The disutility
function is increasing and convex (v′ > 0, v′′ > 0), with v(0) = 0. Note
5 This regulator can be either the Minister of Public Health or the public insurer.
6 Consequently, the provider’s compensation cannot be (directly) based on h.
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that T can also be interpreted as the consumption of a (numeraire)
composite good.7 In what follows, we shall focus on the determination
of the physicians compensation schemes. Specifically, we shall study
how a provider’s compensation T = T (n) should be linked to his number
of patients.
As mentioned earlier, physicians differ in their productivity, which
is assumed to take two values, pii(i = 1,2), with pi2 > pi1. The total
number of physicians, M , is determined by the regulating authority.
Whatever their total number there is a proportion pi of physicians of
type i(i = 1,2), with p1 + p2 = 1. Throughout the paper, the subscript i
is used to distinguish the two types of physicians.
The net benefit of a patient registered with a physician of type i is
given by
Bi = h(piiei)− w(niei), (2)
where w is a waiting cost function that depends upon the overall time
(or effort) spent by the physician for treating his patients. It is increa-
sing and convex (w′ > 0, w′′ > 0). This function reflects the disutility
that patients incur because they have to wait for an appointment or
in the physician’s office. The heavier the workload of a physician the
longer these waiting times will be on average. Patients observe B1 and
B2, and choose the physician who provides them with the highest level
of net benefits.
2.2 Equilibrium
The equilibrium in the market for medical services is contingent upon
the payment scheme T (n) and the total number of physicians, M (both
of which being determined by the regulator). We assume that the regu-
lator has to offer each type of physician at least his reservation utility
V¯ > 0, even for n = 0.8 Formally, the equilibrium is then defined as a
vector of (marketwide) net benefits and (physician type specific) patient
numbers and effort levels, (B˜, n˜1, n˜2, e˜1, e˜2), which satisfies the following
two conditions.
1. Each type of physician chooses his effort level and number of pa-
tients to maximize his utility. Consequently, (n˜i, e˜i) (i = 1,2) is deter-
7 It is worth mentioning that the above setting can be reinterpreted in terms of doctors differing
in their preferences for leisure rather than in their productivity. To see this let us take t = pie
and interpret t as the time that doctors devote to each patient. Substituting for e in the
disutility-of-effort function, the argument of v becomes nt/pi, where 1/pi can be interpreted
as the preference for leisure.
8 This rules out a trivial solution where only high-productivity physicians would be active.
Though attractive from a short-run perspective, this solution would be problematic when
training decisions are accounted for (in particular when potential physicians are uncertain
about their post-training productivity).
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mined by
max
ni,ei
u(ni, T (ni), ei) = T (ni) + γnih(piiei)− v(niei), (3)
subject to
h(piiei)− w(niei) = B˜ (4)
2. All patients must be registered with a health care provider :
M
2∑
i=1
pi n˜i = P (5)
This definition is in the spirit of a competitive equilibrium. Pa-
tients being identical, an equilibrium requires that their net benefits
be equalized across physician types. This marketwide net benefit level
B˜, though endogenously determined at equilibrium, is taken as given
by any physician (condition (4)), who determines his demand for pa-
tients (as well as his effort level) accordingly.9 Finally, (5) is the market
clearing condition stating that the total demand for patients equals
their supply (or number of patients P ).
2.3 Regulating authority
The regulator’s objective function is evaluated at the market equili-
brium induced by its policy (specifying T (n) and M ). It takes into ac-
count the net benefits to patients and the cost of public funds needed
to compensate physicians. With λ denoting the per unit cost of public
funds (λ > 1), the regulator’s objective is given by : 10
W = PB˜ − λM
2∑
i=1
piT (n˜i) (6)
where B˜ and n˜i are defined by (3)–(5), that is the conditions determining
the equilibrium in the health care market.
The regulator’s problem stated this way is quite intricate. To make
it tractable, we shall reformulate it and consider the equivalent mecha-
nism design problem. For this purpose, we must first take a closer look
at the physician’s problem and introduce some additional notation.
9 This is similar to the “utility taking” assumption in the urban economics (and local public
goods) literature.
10 The regulator’s objective function does not take into account the utility of physicians. This
is assumed for simplicity and does not change the nature of our results. As we shall see, the
first-best solution implies that informational rents are zero. The second-best solution implies
a rent equal to zero for low-productivity physicians and a positive rent for high productivity
physicians. This positive rent would be higher if physicians’ utilities were included in social
welfare.
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2.4 Behavior and preferences of physicians : a closer look
First of all, it is convenient to eliminate the (unobservable) effort le-
vel from the physician’s problem. To do this, we introduce the “effort
requirement function”, ei = Ei(n,B), which is defined by :
h (piiEi(n,B))− w (nEi(n,B)) = B, i = 1,2 (7)
This function specifies the level of effort a physician of type i has to
provide for supplying net benefits B to n patients. It has the following
properties :
∂Ei
∂B
= [piih′(piiei)− nw′(nei)]−1, (8a)
∂Ei
∂n
= [piih′(piiei)− nw′(nei)]−1eiw′(nei) (8b)
It seems natural to assume that an increase in the net benefit
required by patients will demand more effort to the physician (∂Ei/∂B >
0). This is equivalent to assuming :
H1 : piih′(piiei)− nw′(nei) > 0, i = 1,2,11
which in turn implies that ∂Ei/∂n > 0 and also that E1(n,B) >
E2(n,B).12
Next, we can substitute Ei(n,B) into the direct utility function (1)
to obtain the following derived utility function :
Vi(T, n,B) = T + γnh (piiEi(n,B))− v (nEi(n,B)) , i = 1,2 (9)
This utility function is a crucial ingredient of the reformulated problem
considered below. In particular, it is used to define indifference curves
for a given B in the (n, T ) - space. In the appendix we show that under
the following hypotheses :
H2 : v′(nei)− γpiih′(piiei) > 0, i = 1,2,
H3 : eiv′(nei)− γh(piiei) > 0, i = 1,2,
these indifference curves are increasing and convex and they satisfy at
any point (n, T ) the single-crossing property :
MRS2T,n < MRS
1
T,n
where
MRSiT,n ≡ −
∂Vi/∂n
∂Vi/∂T
11 Since, by assumption, w′ is strictly positive for all e, and h′ is decreasing with ei one could
also have [piih
′(piiei) − nw
′(nei) < 0] as ei tends to infinity. This would mean that the net
benefit of effort (required for a small increase in B or in n) is negative. This will never be
the case if physicians choose a utility-maximizing effort level for any γ that is not too large.
12 Redefining E as a function of pi, with E(pii, ni, B) ≡ Ei(ni, B) differentiating (7) and making
use of H1 yields ∂E/∂pi = −(pih′ − nw′)−1eh′ < 0.
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T
n
V1
V2
Figure 1 : Relative slopes of indifference curves
is the marginal rate of substitution between T and n for physicians of
type i. These properties are illustrated in Figure 1, where an indiffe-
rence curve for each type of physician is represented, the steepest one
pertaining to the least productive physician.
The above hypotheses mean that physicians need a higher com-
pensation respectively for providing more effort (for a given n) and for
treating more patients (for a given e). They are both satisfied if γ is not
too high. Note also that since the physician’s utility function is quasi-
linear in T , the indifference curves pertaining to each type of physician
are for a given B vertically parallel to each other in the (n, T ) space.
3 Design of the optimal compensation scheme
and the full information optimum
Using the revelation principle, the regulator’s problem stated in sec-
tion 2.3 is equivalent to a mechanism design problem where the re-
gulator searches for the two pairs (n1, T1) and (n2, T2) that he intends
for the first and second types of physicians respectively. In solving this
problem, the regulator must make sure that physicians of type i ac-
tually prefer the pair (ni, Ti) designed for them to the other pair and
that they are compensated enough to participate. This is accounted for
by the incentive-compatibility and individual-rationality constraints of
the following problem :
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maxTi,ni,M,B PB − λ M
∑2
i=1 piTi (10a)
subject to
(MC) M
∑2
i=1 pini = P (10b)
(IR1) V1(T1, n1, B)  V
(IR2) V2(T2, n2, B)  V (10c)
(IC1) V1(T1, n1, B)  V1(T2, n2, B) (10d)
(IC2) V2(T2, n2, B)  V2(T1, n1, B) (10e)
where V stands for the physicians’ reservation utility, i.e. the level of
utility they can reach in the most preferred alternative occupation.
Substituting M from the first constraint into the objective function,
the Lagrangean of this problem can be written as :
L = PB − λP
[
2∑
i=1
pini
]−1 2∑
i=1
piTi
+
2∑
i=1
φiVi(Ti, ni, B) + µ1[V1(T1, n1, B)
− V1(T2, n2, B)] + µ2[V2(T2, n2, B)− V2(T1, n1, B)] (11)
where the φ’s and µ’s are the dual variables of the individual-rationality
and incentive-compatibility constraints respectively. These dual varia-
bles satisfy the usual complementarity conditions that they are equal
to 0 if the corresponding constraints are not binding. It is useful to
first characterize the full information optimum that we shall use as
a benchmark. It can be done by deleting the IC constraints from the
above problem (i.e. setting µi = 0). It is then straightforward to obtain
the following conditions for an optimal allocation :
MRSiT,n =
∑2
i=1 piTi∑2
i=1 pini
≡ α, i = 1,2, (12)
P = λM
2∑
i=1
piMRS
i
T,B (12)
where MRSiT,B = (−∂Vi/∂B)/(∂Vi/∂T ) is the additional compensation
that a physician of type i requires in response to a unit increase in the
net benefit B. In condition (13), α stands for the average cost of trea-
ting a patient; according to this condition, minimizing the overall cost
of treating the P patients imposes that the additional compensation
that either type of physician requires to treat one further patient be
equated to that average cost. As to condition (12), it means that the net
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benefit B must be pushed to the level where at the margin it is equa-
ted with the ratio M/P times the cost of the additional compensation
that physicians require on average for an additional unit of B. With
full information, condition (12) can be decentralized by means of two
different linear payment schemes (one for each physician type) :
Ti(n) = Ai + αn, i = 1,2 (14)
where Ai is set equal to Ti−αni with (ni, Ti) referring to the full-informa-
tion optimum. This is represented in Figure 2. Note that both pairs
(ni, Ti), i = 1,2, are located on the indifference curves corresponding to
V i = V .
T
n
V1=V
T2
α
α
V2=V
T1
A1
A2
n2n1
1
2
Figure 2 : Full-information optimum
4 Second-best solution with asymmetric
information
The full-information optimum is not incentive compatible. This can
easily be understood from Figure 2. For any given n, the level of effort
required to reach a given net benefit B is larger for low-productivity
physicians than for high-productivity ones. Consequently, the former
require a higher compensation than the latter to reach utility V and
type 2 physicians would choose the pair (n1, T1) and therefore mimic
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type 1 physicians. This implies that only the second IC-constraint will
be binding, which in turn implies that the second IR-constraint is al-
ways satisfied (this results from V2(T1, n1) > V1(T1, n1)). In other words,
we have µ1 = 0 and φ2 = 0.
We can now derive the first-order conditions for an optimum of
the regulator’s problem with asymmetric information as specified in
the Lagrangean. These conditions are given with respect to B,n1, n2, T1
and T2 :
P + φ1
∂V1
∂B
+ µ2
(
∂V2
∂B
−
∂Vˆ2
∂B
)
= 0, (15a)
λP
(
2∑
i=1
pini
)−2
p1
2∑
i=1
piTi + φ1
∂V1
∂n1
− µ2
∂Vˆ2
∂n1
= 0, (15b)
λP
(
2∑
i=1
pini
)−2
p2
2∑
i=1
piTi + µ2
∂V2
∂n2
= 0, (15c)
− λP
(
2∑
i=1
pini
)−1
p1 + φ1
∂V1
∂T1
− µ2
∂Vˆ2
∂T1
= 0, (15d)
and
− λP
(
2∑
i=1
pini
)−1
p2 + µ2
∂V2
∂T2
= 0 (15e)
where Vˆ2 = V2(n1, T1, B) refers to the utility of a high-productivity phy-
sician mimicking a low-productivity one.
Using the observation that ∂V2/∂T1 = 1, conditions (15c) and (15e)
yield :
MRS2T,n =
∑2
i=1 piTi∑2
i=1 pini
≡ α (16)
Therefore, compared with (12), the same result as with full information
is obtained, but it only applies to high-productivity physicians. This is
the standard outcome that there is no distortion at the top. Combining
conditions (15b) and (15d) and using ∂V1/∂T1 = ∂Vˆ2/∂T1, we obtain :
p2(MRS1T,n − M̂RS
2
T,n) = p1(α−MRS
1
T,n) (17)
where M̂RS
2
T,n is the high-productivity physicians’ marginal rate of
substitution between T and n taken at point (n1, T1). The single-crossing
property implies that MRS1T,n > M̂RS
2
T,n, and thus we infer the follo-
wing inequality from (17) :
MRS1T,n < α, (18)
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which means that the number of patients treated by each low-producti-
vity physician is reduced relative to the full information optimum (say
by ∆n1). This causes some inefficiency : the corresponding reduction in
his compensation (∆T1) is lower than the additional cost required to
ensure that the patients who are no longer on his list will be treated by
other physicians (∆T1 < α∆n1). However, this inefficiency is desirable
since it reduces the informational rent of high-productivity physicians,
and gets them closer to their reservation utility V¯ . The rationale for this
efficiency loss is illustrated in Figure 3. If the full-information condi-
tionsMRSiT,n = α were satisfied for both types of physicians while fulfil-
ling the second IC-constraint, points 1 and 2 would be chosen, and the
informational rent left to high-productivity physicians would amount
to V2 − V . By moving point 1 to 1′ this rent is reduced by ∆T2 though
at the expense of some efficiency loss due to n′1 < n1 and measured by
α∆n1 −∆T1.
T
n
V1=V
T2
V2
∆T1
A1
A2
n2 = n'2n1
1
2
α
2'
1'
V'2
n'1 = n1-∆n1
2-∆T2
∆T1
Figure 3 : The second-best optimum
The meaning of condition (17) should now be obvious. The reduc-
tion in n1 should be such that the efficiency loss (right-hand side) is
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at the margin equated to what is gained from reducing the informatio-
nal rent (left-hand side). These losses and gains are weighted by the
relevant proportion of physicians.
Conditions (16) and (17) can be implemented by any payment
scheme T (n) which, in the (n, T ) space, goes through the two optimal
points 1′ and 2′ and is, for any other value of n, strictly below the two
relevant indifference curves. The comments for conditions (16) and (17)
apply for any given value of B. What remains to be explained is how
this value is optimally chosen. Using (15d) and (15e), condition (15a)
yields :
P = λM
[
2∑
i=1
piMRS
i
T,B + p2(MRS
1
T,B − M̂RS
2
T,B)
]
(19)
where M̂RS
2
T,B is the MRST,B of high-productivity physicians taken at
(n1, T1) i.e. theMRST,B of type 2 physicians mimicking type 1 ones. This
condition can be given the same interpretation as condition (12), except
that there is here an additional term that pushes up the cost of a unit
increase of B. This term can be interpreted in the following manner.
Consider a unit rise of B ; the additional compensations, ∆T1 and ∆T2,
that are required to keep physicians at their initial utility levels cause
the incentive-compatibility constraint of high-productivity physicians
to be violated. Therefore the compensation of these physicians must be
further increased by an amount equal to MRS1T,B − M̂RS
2
T,B.
These observations are illustrated in Figure 4, where two pairs
of indifference curves are drawn in the (n, T ) space. The pair of plain
curves are those reached at the optimum for some value of B, with
(n1, T1) and (n2, T2) being the optimal contracts. Suppose that we in-
crease the required net benefit to patient B while keeping the n′is and
the physicians’ utilities at their initial levels. Following this move the
two indifference curves rise to the dotted ones. Since the increase of
B requires the low-productivity physicians to raise their effort by a
larger amount than the high-productivity physicians mimicking them,
the dotted curve of the former is above that of the latter at the ver-
tical of n1. As a consequence, the incentive-compatibility constraint
of high-productivity physicians is no longer satisfied, which requires
a further increase in their compensation, equal at the margin, to
MRS1T,B − M̂RS
2
T,B, and which appears in (19).
5 Extension : more general “production
technology”
Let us now assume that the improvement in a patient’s health state
does not only depend on the physician’s effort, but also on the amount
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T
n
V1
T2
V2
T1
n2n1
1
2
V1
V2
Figure 4 : The second-best optimum
of medical services prescribed by the physician. These can be seen as
drugs, laboratory tests, physiotherapy, etc. Total spending on these
medical services is observable by the regulator and is denoted by y.
The production function of physician i (i = 1,2) can then be rewrit-
ten h(piiei, yi). We assume that it is increasing in y (∂h/∂y > 0). Simi-
larly, the effort requirement function of physician i (which continues
to specify the level of effort a physician has to provide for supplying
net benefits B to n patients) is redefined as Ei(n,B, y). Assuming that
physicians’ effort and medical services y are substitutes in production,
an increase in the level of prescriptions will mean less effort for the
provider (∂Ei/∂y < 0).13
The following assumption is made concerning the payment of
these medical services : their cost is supported by the physician, but
it can be compensated through T . The physician’s utility function (1) is
then defined accordingly. Substituting Ei(n,B, y) into the utility func-
13 To see this observe that
∂Ei
∂y
=
− ∂h/∂yi
pii∂h(piiei, yi)/∂(piiei)− niw′(niei)
is negative because h is increasing in y, while the denominator is negative under H1.
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tion yields the following derived utility function :
Vi(T, n,B, y) = T − ny + γnh(piiEi(n,B, y), y)− v(nEi(n,B, y)), i = 1,2
The physician’s compensation function now depends upon both
the number of patients registered and the per-patient cost of medical
services : T (ni, yi). Once the compensation T (ni, yi) has been set by the
regulator, each type of physician chooses y (and n) to maximize his
utility. This is achieved when
MRSiT,y ≡
− ∂Vi/∂y
∂Vi/∂T
=
∂T
∂y
i = 1,2,
where MRSiT,y is the marginal rate of substitution between T and y for
a physician of type i, and ∂T/∂y is the marginal compensation for y. If
∂T/∂y = 0, the provider bears the full cost of y (at the margin); if, on
the other hand, ∂T/∂y = n, he receives full compensation.
Except for the addition of y as argument in functions Ti and Vi, the
mechanism design problem is formulated in the same way as earlier
in (10a). Proceeding as before we first characterize the full information
optimum. The conditions on ni (i = 1,2) and B that have been obtained
earlier carry over without change. It is straightforward to show that at
the optimum :
MRSiT,y =
∂Ti
∂yi
= 0, i = 1,2 (20)
This implies that physicians of both types should, at the margin, bears
the full cost of the medical services they prescribe. It can be imple-
mented by including in Ti a lump-sum component equal to the optimal
value of yi.
Turning to the regulator’s problem with asymmetric information, it is
straightforward to show that the optimality condition on ni (i = 1,2) and
B obtained in section 3 remains unchanged. The optimality condition
on y2 yields :
MRS2T,y =
∂T2
∂y2
= 0, (21)
which coïncides with the optimality condition that has just been obtai-
ned in the full information case. This is no longer true for the condition
on y1 :
MRS1T,y =
∂T1
∂y1
=
p2
p1
(M̂RS
2
T,y −MRS
1
T,y), (22)
which can be given the following interpretation. Suppose that the ex-
pression in parentheses on the right-hand side is positive. This means
that as y1 increases, physicians of type 1 require, for staying on the
same indifference curves, an additional compensation that is lower
than that required by physicians of type 2 who mimic them. If both are
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compensated by the amount required by the former, the latter are made
worse off by the change, which relaxes the incentive-compatibility con-
straint of the latter. This encourages the regulator to make type 1 physi-
cians choose a value of y1 that is larger than in the full information op-
timum, which is obtained by subsidizing y1 at the margin (∂T1/∂y1 > 0).
However, the sign of the expression in parentheses in (22) is am-
biguous, and so we cannot assert whether y1 should be encouraged
(∂T1/∂y1 > 0) or discouraged (∂T1/∂y1 < 0).
6 Concluding remarks
The paper has studied the design of compensation schemes for health
care providers which relate the providers’ earnings to the number of
registered patients. The following results have emerged. First, in a full
information setting, the marginal compensation for a patient must be
the same for all providers and equal to the marketwide average cost
of serving a patient. Second, under incomplete information the num-
ber of patients registered with the low productivity provider is distorted
downward to reduce informational rents of the high productivity provi-
der. Third, the marginal compensation for patients which implements
the optimal (second-best) allocation is lower for low productivity pro-
viders than for high productivity providers. Consequently, it increases
with the number of patients. Fourth, the level of benefits per patients
tends to be lower under incomplete information than under complete
information.
Finally, we have considered an extension of the model where pa-
tients’ health improvement also depends on prescribed medical ser-
vices. We have shown that under full information, providers must bear
the full marginal cost of the prescribed services. Under incomplete in-
formation, the marginal “tax” on the low productivity provider for pres-
criptions may be lower or higher than the first best level; consequently,
it may exceed the full cost of the prescriptions.
Our model clearly only represents a step towards a fully fledged
incentive based theory of health care providers’ compensation
schemes. It admittedly has a number of limitations. The homogeneity
of patients is one of them. The re-examination of our model with he-
terogenous patients is a natural extension. It gives rise to the issue
of patient selection by providers and its impact on the power of the
optimal incentive scheme. Other extensions include function that of a
“regulator” with a different objective (e.g. a private, profit maximizing
insurance company) possibly in competition with the public system
considered in our setting. These issues are left for future research.
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APPENDIX
Lemma 1 : Let Vi(T, n,B) denote the derived utility function of physician
i(i = 1,2). The indifference curves for given B in the (n, T ) space (associa-
ted with Vi) are characterized by the following properties :
i) they are increasing;
ii) they are convex;
iii) they satisfy at any point (n, T ) the single-crossing property.
Proof :
i) The slope of the indifference curves is obtained by totally differentia-
ting Vi and making use of dVi = dB = 0. This yields
∂T
∂n
= [nv′(nei)− γnpiih′(piiei)]
∂Ei
∂n
(n,B) + [eiv′(nei)− γh(piiei)] (A.1)
where ∂Ei/∂n = [piih′(piiei) − nw′(nei)]−1eiw′(nei) is positive if w is in-
creasing and H1 is satisfied. Property i) (∂T/∂n > 0) then follows from
H2, H3 and the fact that ∂Ei/∂n is positive.
ii) Differentiating (A.1) with respect to n, one obtains14
∂2T
∂n2
= (v′ − γpih′)
∂E
∂n
+ ev′′
∂(nE)
∂n
+ (w′ + new′′)
∂(nE)
∂n
[
v′ − γpih′
pih′ − nw′
]
+ new′′
[
v′′ ∂(nE)
∂n
− γpi2h′′ ∂E
∂n
pih′ − nw′
]
− new′′(v′ − γpih′)
[
pi2h′′ ∂E
∂n
− w′ − nw′′ ∂(nE)
∂n
(pih′ − nw′)2
]
where ∂(nE)/∂n = −epih′[pih′−nw′]−1 is positive if h is increasing and H1
is satisfied. Property ii) (∂2T/∂n2 > 0) follows from the fact that ∂E/∂n
and ∂(nE)/∂n are positive, from H1 and H2, and from assumptions on
v (increasing and convex), w (increasing and convex) and h (increasing
and concave).
iii) One has to show that ∂T1/∂n > ∂T2/∂n. Suppose ∂T/∂n is a well-
defined function of pi, say (∂T/∂n)(pii) ≡ ∂Ti/∂n. Differentiating with
respect to pi leads to
∂
∂pi
(
∂T
∂n
)
= (v′ + nv′′)
∂E
∂pi
−
∂(piE)
∂pi
+ n(w′ + ew′′)
∂E
∂pi
[
v′ − γpih′
pih′ − nw′
]
+ new′
[
nv′′ ∂E
∂pi
− γh′ − γpih′′ ∂(piE)
∂pi
]
(pih′ − nw′)
− new′(v′ − γpih′)
[
h′ + pih′′ ∂(piE)
∂pi
− n2w′′ ∂E
∂pi
(pih′ − nw′)2
]
14 For the rest of the proof, we omit for simplicity the subscript i and the arguments of functions
v, h, w, Ei and of their derivatives. For instance we simply write v
′ instead of v′(nei).
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where ∂E/∂pi = −eh′[pih′ − nw′]−1 and ∂(piE)/∂pi = −new′[pih′ − nw′]−1
are both negative if H1 is satisfied and h and w are increasing. Hence
the single-crossing property follows immediately from the negativity of
(∂/∂pi)(∂T/∂n) which, in turn, is implied byH1, H2 and the assumptions
put on v, w and h.
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Résumé
Dans cet article, nous utilisons un modèle d’agence pour étudier com-
ment, dans un contexte d’asymétrie d’informations, la rémunération
d’un médecin devrait être reliée au nombre de patients traités. Les mé-
decins n’ont pas tous la même productivité; les patients qui ont des
besoins homogènes peuvent choisir leur médecin, de sorte qu’à l’équi-
libre, tous les médecins doivent offrir le même niveau de bénéfices nets
(amélioration nette de l’état de santé). Le régulateur qui détermine le
schéma de rémunération se préoccupe à la fois de la qualité des soins
offerts et du niveau des dépenses encourues. Nous montrons que la
solution optimale de second rang donne un schéma de rémunération
dans lequel la rémunération marginale par patient augmente avec le
nombre de patients. Dans une généralisation du modèle, l’amélioration
de l’état de santé du patient peut aussi dépendre des services prescrits
par le médecin; nous examinons comment le coût de ces prescriptions
devrait être pris en compte dans le schéma de rémunération.
Abstract
In this paper we use a principal-agent model to study how the com-
pensation paid to a physician should be related to the number of his
patients. Health care providers are heterogeneous in their productivity;
the homogenous patients are mobile so that their level of net benefits
must be equalized across providers. The regulating agency is concer-
ned with both the quality of care and the level of expenditures. We show
that the second-best (incomplete information) solution implies that the
marginal compensation for a patient increases with the number of pa-
tients. In an extension, we also account for the possibility that the be-
nefits (health improvement) provided to a patient depend on prescribed
services and study how these should enter the compensation scheme.
Mots-clés
Économie de la santé, rémunération des médecins, mécanisme incita-
tif, sélection adverse.
Keywords
Health economics, physicians’remuneration, incentive mechanism, ad-
verse selection.
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